Question Two. Whether the First Sin of the Angel was Formally Pride

24. Second I ask whether the first sin of the angel was formally pride.

25. That it was:

Augustine City of God 14.13 n.1, “The beginning of evil will, what could it have been save pride?” and he proves it by the verse of Scripture, Ecclesiastes 10.15, “The beginning of every sin is pride.” Again he says in the same chapter, “That the vice of exaltation is most of all damned in the devil, we learn from the Sacred Scriptures.”

26. Further in I John 2.16, “Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life.” But the angels did not sin by concupiscence of the eyes or by concupiscence of the flesh - therefore by the pride of life.

27. Further, there is argument by way of division, that they could not have sinned first by any refusing, and consequently not by anger first or avarice or this sort of thing [sc. the rest of the seven capital sins, n.73]; the proof of the antecedent is that every refusing presupposes some willing. Nor did they sin by any ‘inordinate willing’ about temporal goods, or by a sin of the flesh, because such things are not objects of appetite for them.     Therefore by division, once the others are excluded [sc. the others among the seven], it follows that they sinned by the sin of pride [sc. the only one of the seven still left].

28. The thing is also plain from the verse of Psalm 73.23 [n.12], “the pride of those who hate you etc     .;” but they sinned by only a single sin (because otherwise their sin would have been remediable [nn.77-78]), for they did not sin by several sins at once, since the will cannot have two perfect acts at the same time, as neither can the intellect; therefore if they sinned by several sins, they sinned by one sin after another - and so in the second instant they could have repented (and therefore they sinned after the first instant [n.78]), which is commonly held to be unacceptable, because it is commonly held that their sin was irremediable.

29. To the opposite:

Their sin was the greatest, because irremediable. But pride is not the greatest sin -the thing is plain, because its opposite, namely humility, is not the greatest good, both because humility can be unformed but not charity (    therefore humility is less ‘good’), and because, speaking of the moral virtues, humility is a sort of temperance - but all temperance is less perfect than friendship, which is the most perfect virtue under justice (Ethics 5.3 1129b29-30, 8.1.1155a1-2, 8.4.1156b7-10). Therefore etc     .

30. Further, pride is placed in the irascible power; but no act of the irascible power can be first, because the irascible power fights on behalf of the concupiscible power - and therefore the passions of the irascible power arise from the passions of the concupiscible.

31. Further, pride seems to be an appetite for excellence (because according to Augustine City of God 14.13 n.1, “What is pride but an appetite for perverse eminence?”) - but excellence is in respect of some others whom it excels; but the angel did not first desire something in its order to others, but he first desired something in himself before desiring it in its order to something else; just as nothing is to a second save what is first to itself, so no one desires something in its order to another unless he was first desiring for himself - and consequently he was first desiring that [sc. eminence] for himself.

32. Further, the inferior demons do not seem to desire a dominion disagreeable to them - nor even to have consented to the dominion of Lucifer, because it seems probable that they desired more to be subject to God than to Lucifer; therefore their first sin was not pride.

I. To the Question

33. In this question the affirmative side is commonly held [sc. that the first sin of the angel was pride], because of the argument by division for the first side [n.27]. But in order to see the truth of the question, one must first see what the malice was in the first angel sinning - and second, to what class of sin that malice belonged

A. What the Malice was in the First Angel Sinning

1. On Ordered and Disordered Acts of the Will

34. As to the first, one must see first about the order of acts of the will. And on this point I say that there is in general a double act of the will, namely to will and to refuse; for ‘to refuse’ is a positive act of the will whereby it flees the disagreeable or recoils from a disagreeable object; while ‘to will’ is an act whereby it accepts some agreeable object. There is also - further - a double ‘to will’, which can be called the to will of friendship and the to will of concupiscence, so that the ‘to will of friendship’ is of the object for which I will a good, and the ‘to will of concupiscence’ is of the object that I will for some loved other.

35. And of these acts [sc. to will, to refuse] the order is plain, because every refusing presupposes some willing; for I do not flee from something save because it cannot stand along with something that I accept as agreeable; and this is what Anselm says Fall of the Devil 3, when he posits an example about miser, coin, and bread.“For a miser, when he wants to hold onto his coins and prefers bread, which he cannot have unless he gives a coin - he first wants to give, that is to abandon a coin, than not to want to hold onto it. Because not for this reason does he want to give, that he does not want to hold onto the coin; but for this reason he does not want to hold onto the coin, that in order to have bread he necessarily has to give...Therefore not wanting to hold onto something is not always prior to wanting to abandon it, but sometimes to want to abandon is prior.” ⁶ And of these two willings [sc. of friendship, of concupiscence] the order is plain, because concupiscence presupposes the willing of friendship; for since the ‘beloved’ is - with respect to the coveted thing - the end, as it were, for whom I will the good (for because of the beloved I covet for him the good that I will for him), and since the end possesses the first idea of the thing willed - it is plain that the willing of friendship precedes the willing of concupiscence.

36. And from this proved conclusion there follows further that a similar process exists in disordered acts of the will; for no refusing is the first disordered act of the will, because a refusing could not be had save in virtue of some willing - and if the willing were ordered (by accepting the object along with its due circumstances), the refusing that would consequently be had would likewise be ordered;a in the same way, if the willing of friendship were ordered, the willing of concupiscence consequent to it would be ordered - for if I love in ordered way that for which I love the good, I will in ordered way what I covet for that for which I will the good.

a. a[Interpolation] for if I love in ordered way, I hate in ordered way what is harmful to the thing loved.

2. On the First Disorder in the ‘Willing of Friendship’

37. The result, therefore, is that the simply first disordered act of will was ‘the first willing of friendship’ with respect to that for which it willed the good. But this object was not God, because the will could not have loved God from friendship in disordered way - by intensity - , for God is a lovable object of such sort that, from the mere idea of him as he is the object, he gives the complete nature of goodness to an act perfectly intense. Nor is it likely that the will too intensely loved with love of friendship something other than itself, both because natural inclination is more inclined to thus loving itself than any other created thing - and because it does not seem that the angel understood any created thing beside himself in the way he understood himself - and because friendship is founded on unity (Ethics 8.71158a10-13) and also the features of friendship toward another proceed from the features of friendship toward oneself (Ethics 9.8.1168b1-10). So the first disordered act of the angel was an act of friendship with respect to himself.

38. And this is what Augustine says City of God 14.28, “Two loves made two cities; the love of God to contempt of self made the city of God, and the love of self to contempt of God made the city of the devil.” The first root, then, of the ‘city of the devil’ was a disordered love of friendship, which ‘root’ germinated into contempt of God -wherein this malice was consummated.

Thus are things plain about the simply first disorder, which was simply in the first disordered willing.

3. On the First Disorder in the ‘Willing of Concupiscence’

39. It now remains to see about the first disorder in the ‘willing of concupiscence’.

a) On the Concupiscence of Blessedness

40. [Proof that the angel first coveted blessedness immoderately for himself] -And it seems that here one must say that the angel first coveted blessedness immoderately for himself. The proof is:

First as follows, for the first disordered ‘coveting’ did not proceed from affection for justice, just as neither did any sin so proceed;     therefore from affection for advantage, because “every elicited act of the will is elicited according to the affection either for justice or for advantage,” according to Anselm (Fall of the Devil 4). The greatest advantage is most greatly desired by a will not following the rule of justice, and so is desired first, because nothing else rules a will that is not right save a disordered and immoderate appetite for the greatest good of advantage; but the greatest advantage is perfect blessedness; therefore etc     . And this reason is got from Anselm ibid.

41. The second proof is this, that the first sin in ‘coveting’ was some willing; for one does not shun anything away from oneself - that is, so that something not reach one -save because one covets the opposite for oneself. The angel coveted it, then, either with love of the honorable, or with love of the useful, or with love of the delightful (because there is only this triple love for loving something with); not with love of the honorable, because then the angel would not have sinned; nor with love of the useful, because that love is not first (for because the useful is useful with respect to something, no one first desires the useful but that for which it is useful). He first sinned, then, by loving something excessively as the supremely delightful thing; but the supremely delightful thing is the honorable good and very blessedness, whereby the delightful thing is supreme;     therefore etc     . - And this argument can be taken from the Philosopher Ethics 8.2.1155b18-21, from the common distinction of the good into useful, delightful, and honorable.

42. Third it is proved thus, that every appetitive power, consequent in its act to some act of the apprehensive power, desires first the delightful thing most agreeable to its cognitive power - or first desires delight in the desirable thing, because in such desirable thing it is most at rest; this is plain of appetite consequent to the apprehension of taste or hearing or touch - because any such appetite desires the most perfect object of the apprehensive power whose act it follows in desiring. Therefore the will, when separated from all sensitive appetite, first of all desires that which is most agreeable to the intellect, whose agreeableness the desire follows - or it first desires delight in such object and consequently blessedness, inclusive of object and act and consequent delight.

43. Fourth it is proved thus: that thing is first desired by a will not ruled by justice which - if there were that thing alone - would alone by desired and nothing else without it. Such is delight; for no excellence or anything else - if it were sad - would be desired, but delight or something such would be desired.

44. As far as this second stage is concerned, then, namely as to the sin of the angel, it seems that he first coveted blessedness:

Because just as the first sin of the visual appetite would be in desiring the visible thing most beautiful to its cognitive power (and in which it would perfectly delight and be at rest), so, in the case of a will conjoined with sensitive appetite - when it is not following justice or the rule of reason - the first desirable is something supremely delightful to that sensitive appetite which the will is most in conformity with in acting. And so there is in men a domination of the sensitive appetites according to the diversity of their bodily composition; indeed, if any cognitive power whatever has its proper appetite and there is, according to diversity of composition, a diversity of dominion in diverse cognitive powers and in their appetitive powers, then in anyone at all - I say - the will, according to the predominance of sensitive appetite, is most inclined to the act of that appetite; and therefore some people, following their first inclination without the rule of justice, are first inclined to luxury, some first to pride, and some otherwise.

45. So a will separated from all sensitive appetite, and consequently not inclined to anything because of inclination of sensitive appetite, such a will - having deserted from justice - follows the absolute inclination of the will as will; and this inclination seems to be to the greatest thing agreeable to the will or to the appetitive power, which thing is also the greatest perfection of the intellect or of the cognitive power - for what the cognitive power is most perfected in, that is what the appetitive power corresponding to the cognitive power is most perfected in. The immoderate concupiscence, then, was for blessedness, because blessedness is the object of the will.

46. [Reasons to the contrary] - And if argument be given against this:

First, because according to Augustine, On the Trinity 13.5 n.8, “blessedness is desired by everyone;” but what is uniformly in everyone seems to be natural; therefore blessedness is desired naturally. But natural appetite is always right, because it is from God; therefore a will consonant with it is right, because what is consonant with the right is right; therefore no one sins in desiring blessedness.

47. Further, no intellect errs about the principles (Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5) -therefore neither does the will about the end. The consequence is proved through the similitude of the Philosopher in Ethics 7.9.1151a16-17 and Physics 2.9.200a15-16: “as the principle is in matters of speculation, so the end is in matters of action.”

48. Further, third: the good had affection for advantage just as did the bad; but according to Anselm On Concord 3.13, the will “cannot not will advantage;”     therefore the good will advantage just as do the bad. Therefore all sinned equally if they sinned from affection for advantage; therefore etc     .

49. [Solution of these reasons] - To see the solution to these reasons, I distinguish what can be understood by the affections for justice and for advantage that Anselm speaks of in Fall of the Devil 4 [n.40].

Justice can be understood to be either infused (which is called gratuitous justice), or acquired (which is called moral justice), or innate (which is the liberty itself of the will). For if it were understood - according to the fiction of Anselm in Fall of the Devil -that there was an angel that had the affection for advantage and not the one for justice (that is, having an intellective appetite merely as such appetite and not as free), such an angel would not be able not to will advantage, or even not to will it supremely; nor would this be imputed to him for sin, because the appetite would be related to his cognitive power as the seeing appetite is to sight, by necessarily following what the cognitive power shows and the inclination to the best thing shown by that power, because it would not have means to hold itself back. The affection for justice, then, which is ‘the first moderator of the affection for advantage’, both as regards the will’s not having actually to desire what the affection for advantage inclines to, and as regards its not having to desire it supremely (namely what the affection of advantage inclines to) - this affection for justice, I say, is the liberty innate to the will, because it is the first moderator of the above sort of affection.

50. And although Anselm frequently speaks of an act not only of the justice that is acquired but also of the one that is infused (because he says it is lost by mortal sin, which is only true of infused justice), yet by distinguishing, from the nature of the thing, the first two ideas among these [sc. affection for advantage, affection for justice, intellective appetite, free appetite], insofar as the first inclines the will supremely to advantage, while the second moderates it so that in eliciting an act it does not have to follow its inclination - these two affections are nothing other than the same will insofar as it is intellective appetite and insofar as it is free; because, as was said [n.49], insofar as it is merely intellective appetite, it would be supremely inclined actually to the best intelligible (as in the case of the best visible and sight), but insofar as it is free, it can hold itself back in eliciting an act so that it does not follow the inclination - whether as to the substance of the act or as to the intensity of it - to which the power is naturally inclined.

51. But a power, if it were appetitive precisely [sc. and not also free], following its inclination in its act as the seeing appetite follows sight and the inclination of sight, although - I say - that power could only desire what was intelligible (just as the seeing appetite can only desire what is visible), yet it could not then sin, because there would not be in its power anything else or any desiring otherwise than as the cognitive power would show and would incline towards. However, when the same power has now been made free (because this is nothing other than that one thing includes virtually several ideas of perfection, which it would not include if it were without the idea of freedom), this power - I say - can, by its liberty, hold itself back in willing, both as to willing what the affection for advantage inclines to and even if it incline supremely to willing advantage; and because it can be moderated, it is bound to be moderated according to the rule of justice that is received from a superior will. So it is plain, according to this, that a free will is not bound in every way to will blessedness (the way a will, if it were only intellective appetite, without liberty, would will it), but it is bound - in eliciting an act -to moderate the appetite qua intellective appetite, which is to moderate the ‘affection for advantage’, so that namely it not will immoderately.

52. But the will - while being able to moderate itself - can in three ways immoderately will the blessedness that befits it: as to intensity, that is, by willing it with greater effort than befits it; or as to timing, namely by willing it more quickly for itself than befits it; or as to cause, namely by willing it otherwise for itself than befits it, as without merits; - or perhaps in other ways that there is no need to be concerned with here.

53. So it is probable that in one of these ways the angel’s will went to excess: namely either desiring blessedness for himself as it is a good for himself more than loving that good in itself, namely by desiring that good (as the beatific object) to be his own good as a good for himself more than desiring it to be present in another (as in his God) - and this is the supreme perversity of the will, which is ‘using what should be enjoyed and enjoying what should be used’ according to Augustine 86 Questions q.30; or, in the second way, the angel could have desired to have blessedness at once, when however God wanted him to have it after some little while on the way; or in the third way, by desiring it to be had from natural powers (not having it by grace), when however God wanted it to be had from merits.

54. The free will therefore should have moderated its affection as to these circumstances, which right reason had to show it; because blessedness should have been desired less for itself than for God, and should have been desired for the time for which God willed it, and from the merits for which God willed it should be desired. Therefore if in one of these ways the will followed the affection of advantage, not moderating it through justice (that is through infused justice, if it had it, or through acquired, or through innate or natural justice, which is freedom itself), then it sinned.

55. Hereby therefore to the arguments:

To the first [n.46]. Natural will is not of itself immoderate but inclined only by way of nature - and in this it is not immoderate, because it is inclined the way it has received to be inclined, nor is there anything else in its power; but in the power of the will, as it is free in elicited act, there is only its being inclined, or less inclined.

56. So when the argument assumes the proposition that ‘the will is natural in respect of blessedness’ I concede it - but it is not actually immoderate in elicited act; for the ‘inclination of natural appetite’ is not any elicited act but is a sort of first perfection -and this is not immoderate, just as neither is the nature immoderate whose it is. Yet it is inclined by affection for advantage to its object such that - if it had of itself an elicited act - it could not moderate it from being elicited supremely as much as it could be elicited; but the will as having only natural affection for advantage is not cause of any elicited act but is so only as free, and so ‘as eliciting an act’ it has the means for moderating passion.

57. When therefore the proposition is assumed that ‘the will, consonant with natural will, is always right (because natural will too is always right)’ [n.46] I respond and say that it is consonant with itself in eliciting an act as it would elicit it if it were acting of itself alone; but it is not right, because it has another rule in acting than that it would have if it were to act from itself alone; for it is bound to follow a superior will, from which - in moderating that natural inclination - the moderating or not moderating is in its power, because it is in its power not to act supremely on what it has power for.

58. To the second [n.47] I say, through the same point, that it is not in the power of the intellect to moderate its assent to truths which it apprehends, for to the extent there is shown to it the truth of the principles from the terms, or the truth of conclusions from the principles, to that extent it must assent, because of its lack of liberty. But the will has power - over itself and the inferior powers - to moderate the inclination from being altogether dominant in eliciting the act, or at least to moderate it so that the act is not elicited; for it can turn the intellect away so that it does not speculate about the sort of objects of speculation about which it would be inclined, and the will is bound to turn it away if speculation of them is a sin materially for the intellect or formally for the will; thus - on the other side - the will, with respect to the ultimate end, is bound to moderate its inclination for that end so that it not will it immoderately, namely in a way other than it should will it, and so that it not will it for itself in a way other than that end is in itself.

59. In another way it can be said that, just as an act of the intellect ‘when considering a principle in itself’ cannot be false, so neither can an act of will ‘when loving the end in itself’ be bad - and this act is an act of friendship, not an act of concupiscence; yet, just as an act of intellect could be false in attributing the truth of the first cause to some created principle which that truth does not fit - so an act of the will can be bad in coveting the goodness of the ultimate end for something other than the ultimate end in a way that does not fit that something other.

60. To the third [n.48] I reply that in the good there was as much a natural inclination to blessedness as in the bad - even a greater one if they had better natural powers, because the inclination accords with the perfection of the natural powers; yet the good, in eliciting their act, did not use the will according to its imperfect idea, namely to the extent it is an intellective appetite only, namely by acting in the sort of way they would desire to act by the intellective appetite - but they used the will according to its perfect idea (which is liberty), by acting according to the will in the way in which it is fitting to act freely as a free thing acts, but this was in accord with the rule of the determining superior will, and that justly.

61. And when it is said ‘the angel cannot not will advantage’ [n.48], I reply: the good neither could nor wanted to refuse blessedness for themselves, even by coveting it for themselves - but they did not will it for themselves more than they willed well being in itself for God, rather they willed it less so, because they were able to moderate their willing through their liberty.

62. And if you object ‘therefore in no way did they desire blessedness well for themselves, but they only moderated well their desiring it’ - I reply that to have a perfect act of desiring good for oneself, so that thereby the object in itself is more loved, I say that this is from the affection of justice, because what I love something in itself for is what I will it in itself for. And thus the good could desire blessedness so that - in having it - they would more perfectly love the supreme good; and this act of coveting blessedness would be meritorious, because it does not use but enjoys what should be enjoyed; for the good that I covet for myself I covet for this reason, that I may love that good in itself more.

b) On the Concupiscence of Excellence

63. Having seen, then, about the first thing inordinately coveted [n.48], one can posit that the angel further coveted inordinately another good for himself, namely excellence in respect of others. Either he had a disordered refusal, namely refusing the opposites of the things he coveted, namely by not willing blessedness to be in himself less than it is in God in himself (or than God is); or by refusing to wait for blessedness until the end of the way; or by refusing to have it from merits but from himself [nn.52-54] and, as a result, refusing to be subject to God - and finally not wanting God to exist, wherein, as in the supreme evil, his malice seems to be consummated [n.38]; for just as no act is formally better than loving God, so neither is any act formally worse than hating God.

B. To what Class of Sin the Malice in the First Angel Sinning belonged.

64. As to the second article [n.33], it remains to be seen what sort of sin the immoderate love of friendship is [nn.37-38]; and what sort of sin the immoderate concupiscence of blessedness is [nn.40-62] that the angel coveted for itself according to one of the three stated modes [n.53]; and what sort of sin the consequent refusal is, and this whichever of the aforesaid kinds [n.63] the inordinate refusal was.

65. As to the first of these [n.64] it is said that the sin was pride.

And it seems to be the intent of Augustine City of God 14.13 n.1, where he supposes that presumption is ‘pleasing oneself too much’ - and for this reason are ‘the proud’ called in Scripture ‘self-pleasers’; therefore since this immoderate love of self is an immoderate being pleased with oneself, it was properly pride and thus presumption.

66. But this seems doubtful, because if pride is properly an immoderate appetite for one’s own excellence, and being immoderately pleased with oneself does not properly seem to be an immoderate appetite for excellence - how then is it pride?

67. Again, secondly: the presumptuous person seems to prefer himself to others, either in goods which he really has or in those he reckons himself to have of himself - but immoderate love of oneself does not seem to be this sort of preferring of oneself, because immoderately loving oneself with love of friendship and immoderately loving another thus (as a neighbor) seem to be of the same nature in malice; but no one by loving another immoderately is said to be presumptuous, but rather luxurious; therefore he is not said to be presumptuous by loving himself either.a

a. a[Interpolation; cf. Rep. II A d.6 q.2] Again, the angel did not first sin by desiring excellence in respect of others (as a sort of master), because the good for himself and to himself came first - nor by desiring excellence in the opinion of others, because then he would have desired a false excellence. For that reason he [sc. Scotus] said that the angel’s first sin was not pride properly speaking, but, because of the delight which it properly imported, seems rather to be reduced to luxury [n.71] - just as the sin whereby someone inordinately delights in speculation of a conclusion of geometry is reduced to luxury.

68. To these [nn.66-67] I say that someone loving a good immoderately wants it to be immoderately a great good, even the greatest good; and therefore he immoderately - because without his willing something to be present by which that good might increase - wills it to be more in itself than it is. And when he is unable to attain its being in itself more and greater than it is (because this is impossible), he wills as a consequence that it be greatest in the way it can be greatest, and this either in comparison or in opinion; in comparison, that is, so that it might excel the goods of others - in opinion namely so that others might think his good to be the greatest. And therefore the will of being preeminent or dominant above all others follows the willing by which someone wills immoderately his own good.

69. I say therefore to the first argument [n.66] that one who presumes (as presumption is the first species of pride [n.66]) does not will his own good to excel the goods of others according to any superiority, nor even does he will it to excel in fame (as in the case of him who desires praise), but he wills it to be great in itself, and so great that - without the addition of anything else - he wills it to be greater than all other things that he does not thus will. In this way it can be conceded that immoderate love of oneself -which is ‘the root of the city of the devil’ [n.38] - is presumption, because anyone who loves himself immoderately wills that he be as good as is able to be proportionate to the act by which he loves himself; and in this way can Augustine be expounded in City of God [n.65], and expounded well, because ‘he who pleases himself immoderately’ is proud (and this in the first species of pride), and that not by desiring the excellence that is a kind of relation, but by desiring the excellence that is ‘greatness in itself’, from which greatness follows his excellence in relation to others.

70. To the second [n.67] I say that presumption is not a sin of the intellect, as if the intellect of the presumptuous person were to judge or show itself to be as great as it is not - but it is a sin of the will immoderately desiring its own good to be as great as it is not, and from this follows the blinding of the intellect. But when it is added also that ‘the immoderate willing of oneself does not seem to be pride, as neither the immoderate loving of one’s neighbor’ [n.67] - see the response elsewhere [nn.74, 69].

71. But as to the disorder of the willing of concupiscence [n.64], it seems that that appetite for blessedness was not properly pride - not, to be sure, as to the first species of it; the thing is plain, because presumption (the way it was expounded in the preceding article [n.69]), if it belonged to the first inordinate willing of friendship, does not belong to any willing of concupiscence. And if it has to be reduced to something, it seems more consonant with the sin of luxury; for although luxury exists properly in acts of the flesh, yet everything delightful - desired immoderately insofar as it is delightful - can be called luxury, provided it is not a coveted excellence (such as that ‘appetite for blessedness’ was not).

72. As to the disorder of the third act, namely refusal [n.64], it is plain enough that any of those inordinate refusings was avarice or envy.

73. And if it be objected about the above disordered coveting [n.71] that it was not the sin of luxury, therefore it was properly some other sin - and it does not seem, by division, that it was anything other than pride [n.27] (as is proved by that famous and common division of mortal sins into seven) - I reply:

Whether mortal sins be distinguished by the bad habits opposite to the good ones (such as are the seven good habits, namely the four moral ones [courage, temperance, justice, prudence, Wisdom 8.7] and the three theological ones [faith, hope, charity, I Corinthians 13.13]), or whether - which seems more the case - by good acts (such as are the acts of the ten commandments [Exodus 20.1-17]), whether this way or that, the sevenfold division of capital sins would not be sufficient, because, in the first way, there would need to be seven capital sins other than theseOther than the usual seven (pride, avarice or greed, envy, wrath, lust, gluttony, and sloth or acedia), which, in the first way, would have to be the opposites of the four cardinal virtues - imprudence, injustice, intemperance, cowardice - and the three theological virtues -infidelity, despair, hatred. ⁷ (for infidelity and despair are properly opposite to those listed seven [the cardinal and theological virtues] and are not contained under any of the usual seven [the capital sins]), but in the second way there would have to be ten capital sins according to transgression of the Decalogue. This division [sc. of capital sins], then, should not be held to be sufficient for all evil acts, although they are not roots first (nor perhaps the principal sins), but perhaps very common to other sins, as occasions for sinning.

II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the principal arguments [nn.25-28].

To the first [n.25 - no response is given to the second part of the first argument ] I say that Augustine is speaking of the simply first sin, which was an inordinate willing of friendship - and that was presumption; and I concede that that presumption was the simply first sin, but not as it is the first species of pride, the way it is properly taken [n.69].

75. To the second, about the division from John (“Everything that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes and the pride of life” [n.26]), it is plain from what he first says “Everything that is in the world” that this is a bringing together of the men living in the world - such that the sins by which men commonly sin are contained under those three. But there is no need that the first sin of the angel, a spiritual one (whereby the angels originally sinned), be contained under this carnal sin; but their sin of concupiscence at the second stage [n.44], if it need to be reduced, should rather be reduced to the concupiscence of the eyes; for just as in us immoderate appetites for any beautiful visible thing have reference to the concupiscence of the eyes, so also in the angels the immoderate appetite for anything delightful should have reference to the concupiscence of the eyes.

76. As to the third [n.27], it is plain that that division by seven, about the seven capital sins, is not sufficient [n.73] - making comparison with the act of concupiscence -save by a sort of reduction; and in this way it can be conceded that the angels’ sin may be reduced to luxury as an inordinate appetite for the delightful, as delightful to the concupiscence, for example, of the eyes.

77. To the fourth [n.28] I say that there was not one single sin only, because there were many sins, as was said in d.4-5 n.45.

78. And when it is said that ‘the first sin of the angel was irremediable’ [n.28], I say that when he sinned with the second sin he was still on the way - and consequently, when he sinned with the second sin, he could have repented of the first sin and have, further, received pardon and mercy, and thus the first sin was not of itself irremediable; however, from the fact of the angel’s reaching the term while in that first sin, all his sins became irremediable; for any sin of any sinner, when it perdures to the term, is irremediable (and how that irremediability is only from the law of God, which has grace for no one when he is in the term, will be stated below in d.7 nn.51-54, 56, 60). I deny, therefore, what is assumed there [n.28], that there was only one sin; hence the malice of the demon began from immoderate love of himself, which was not the greatest sin - and it was consummated in hatred of God, which is the greatest sin, because from it followed that the angel could not have what he willed while God remains; and therefore from his inordinate appetite he first willed God not to be, and thus to hate him.a

a. a[Interpolation ] But there is here a doubt, namely whether anyone could desire God not to be -because, just as nothing can be the object of volition save under the idea of good, so neither of refusal save under the idea of bad; but in God there is no idea of bad apprehended by an angel. Nor can it be said that God could be hated because of justice, because no idea of bad is apprehended in his justice just as neither in himself; for although there appear in the effect of justice some idea of bad, yet not in itself; and if this is true, then one must say that the hatred is not with respect to God in himself, nor with respect to his justice, but as to the effect that is appropriated to the perfection of justice. And hereby one can say to the verse of the Psalm “the pride of those who hate you etc.” [n.28] that it is not directed to him in himself but is in their wanting his justice not to be avenging - and thus they refuse his justice as to its avenging effect. And if this is true, then one must say that their hatred of God is not the greatest sin [n.78], because it does not regard God in himself, but is against him in reference to his effect; likewise, it then follows that it would not have ‘loving God’ as the directly contrary act, but only the act contrary to the love of the effect.

III. To the Arguments for the Opposite

79. To the first argument for the opposite [n.29] I say that the first sin was not the greatest; for just as in the case of goods there is a process from the more good to the less good (as from love of the end to love of what is for the end), so - conversely - in the case of bads there is a process from the less bad to the greater bad, according to Augustine City of God 14.28 [n.46], “love of self to contempt of God.”

80. The other two arguments, namely about the passion of the irascible power in respect of the concupiscible, and about the appetite for one’s own excellence (speaking of excellence as it states a comparison to others of the one excelling [nn.30-31]), can be conceded, because - as concerns the act of concupiscence - the angel did not first covet excellence, which is a passion of the irascible or the concupiscible, but most perfect blessedness; however if we speak of the first inordinate willing of friendship, one can say that it was not an act or a passion of the irascible, but of the concupiscible; for if it is the mark of the concupiscible to covet the good for the one loved, it is its mark to love also the loved good for whom it covets that good.

81. To the verse from 1 Timothy 6.10, “the root of all evils is greed”...Scotus here responds to an argument not given above but contained in the Lectura 11 d.6 n.21. It has no particular reply there but only the general one that the answer to objections is plain from what has been said. The fourth argument given above in the Ord. here is not responded to by Scotus. ⁸